**Information Asymmetry and Organizational Structure** 

Abstract

We test for differences in information asymmetry across two organizational forms in the REIT

industry. We find significant differences with external REITs being significantly more transparent

relative to internal REITs, and these differences are reflected in the loan contract terms and loan

syndicate structure of loans made to these two types of REITs. We find that the relatively more

transparent externally advised REITs are offered more favourable loan contracts in terms of

discounts in loan rate charged, less stringent collateral requirement and covenants, and that loans

to external REITs have syndicates that are larger in size and the lead lender retains a smaller

portion of the loan.

Key words: external advisor; Real Estate Investment Trust; organizational structure; loan contract

terms; information opacity; certification effect

JEL classification: G20, L85, L00, L22